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Abstract

Compton, James, M.A., Spring 2022

History

Mansfield, Marines, and Mothers: The Politics of Resistance to the American Intervention in North
China from 1945-1946

Chairperson: Dr. Kyle G. Volk

At the conclusion of World War II, American citizens, including millions of deployed
servicemen, reasserted the democratic freedoms they sacrificed to win the war. The American
intervention in North China during the Chinese Civil War presented a ripe opportunity for civic
restoration in late 1945. Controversial and seemingly at odds with the stated goals of the Second
World War—namely the “Four Freedoms” and the Atlantic Charter—the US military presence in
North China faced formidable domestic political obstacles. This thesis explores the nexus of
domestic politics and foreign policy in the post-World War II era. Focusing on 1945-1946, this
project steps beyond the oft-studied foreign service personalities to examine the important role of
Congress, the military, and public opinion in constraining US participation in the Chinese Civil
War.
As the title suggests, Mansfield, Marines, and mothers are important political characters
anchoring this research. I argue that Representative Mike Mansfield, from Montana’s first
congressional district, served a vital role in elevating the dangers of the North China intervention
in the public consciousness. With speeches critical of the Truman administration’s China policy
in the House of Representatives, Mansfield’s words resonated with deployed Marines, their
families, and with organized citizens’ groups. The lifting of wartime censorship also allowed
iv

Marines in China to write congressmen, newspaper editors, and their families expressing
opposition to direct participation in the Chinese Civil War. Marine leadership also skillfully
interpreted opaque orders and carefully avoided an expanded role. Marines’ families, and in
particular mothers and spouses, crafted sophisticated arguments against expanded US military
intervention in the language of self-determination, freedom, and democracy. Finally, I conclude
that the deluge of public opinion at the outset of the North China intervention was an important
factor in constraining American participation in the Chinese Civil War and in the genesis of the
Marshall Mission.
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A Note on Romanization and Names

Historians writing about Chinese history in English must confront the challenge of how
to present a language that uses fundamentally different characters and sounds. Two dominant
English transliterations, Wade-Giles and Hanyu Pinyin, shifted temporally along with the
political landscape of China during its tumultuous twentieth-century history. The Wade-Giles
transliteration originated in England and owes its moniker to the two Cambridge professors who
developed, refined, and proliferated it in the nineteenth century. Thomas Francis Wade was a
product and agent of British imperialism in China, first arriving as a soldier during the Opium
Wars and finishing forty years in the middle kingdom as a diplomat during the late Ch’ing
(Qing) dynasty. Upon return to England, Wade became a professor of Chinese at Cambridge.1
Throughout his life, Wade published scholarship about China and, most importantly, developed a
romanization technique for Mandarin Chinese based upon the Peking (Beijing) dialect. Wade’s
successor at Cambridge, Herbert Allen Giles, also served as a diplomat in imperial China and
built upon Wade’s scholarship. Most notably, Giles published the first Chinese-English
dictionary in 1892, which modified and standardized Wade’s system for a wider audience.2
Hanyu Pinyin transliteration, or simply Pinyin, developed in Communist China after the Chinese
Civil War. Pinyin is the official romanization system of the Peoples’ Republic of China and
Wade-Giles remains in use in Taiwan, reflecting the enduring political chasm.3

James L. Hevia, “An Imperial Nomad and the Great Game: Thomas Francis Wade in China,” Late Imperial China
16, no. 2 (1995): 1-22.
2
"Giles, Herbert Allen." In Chambers Biographical Dictionary, by Liam Rodger, and Joan Bakewell. 9th ed.
Chambers Harrap, 2011.
3
"Pinyin." In The Columbia Encyclopedia, by Paul Lagasse, and Columbia University. 8th ed. Columbia University
Press, 2018.
1

viii

In this thesis, I chose the Wade-Giles Chinese transliteration over Pinyin for place names
and historical actors. I did so for two primary reasons. First, Wade-Giles romanization was the
language of the 1945-1946 era for Marines, diplomats, journalists, and politicians. The characters
in this story, especially Marines, mothers, and wives, all knew and understood Chinese locations
and politicians in their Wade-Giles form. Secondly, Wade-Giles is in keeping with the primary
source material upon which this thesis is based. Supporting maps and images from the postWorld War II period all use the Wade-Giles names for historical actors and locations. I have
included historical maps within the body of the text so that the reader can better understand the
spatial elements of the story. In the twenty-first century, however, readers may understandably
elect to consult digital maps—as I did numerous times during this research project. The digital
maps of 2022 will all follow the Pinyin transliteration. Additionally, most published scholarship
about mainland China in the twenty-first century uses Pinyin. To mitigate frustration for the
reader, I have included a reference table of place names and historical actors in both Pinyin and
Wade-Giles.
Wade-Giles

Pinyin

Peiping

Beijing

Tientsin

Tianjin

Chungking

Chongqing

Shantung

Shandong

Hopeh

Hebei

Chinwangtao

Qinhuangdao

Chefoo

Zhifu

Taku

Dagu

Mao Tse-tung

Mao Zedong

Chou En-lai

Zhou Enlai

Chiang Kai-shek

Jiang Jieshi
ix

Introduction
In Montana’s Bitterroot Valley in 1945, Ethel Wonnacott scoured newspapers for stories
from the Western Pacific. As a devout Mormon, a meatpacker, a wife, and the mother of two,
Wonnacott would seem an unlikely candidate for political activism regarding America’s foreign
affairs.4 Yet like millions of other American mothers during World War II, Wonnacott had ample
reason to stay informed and involved. Her youngest son, twenty-year old Private First Class
Gilbert E. Wonnacott, was fighting across the Pacific with the United States Marines.5 With the
sudden news of the Japanese surrender in mid-August, the Wonnacott family must have felt a
profound sense of relief. The much-dreaded invasion of the Japanese mainland would not take
place. Wonnacott and the rest of the Third Amphibious Corps (IIIAC), however, did not return
immediately to the comfort of their waiting families. Instead, he and 53,000 other Marines
deployed from Guam and Okinawa to China’s Shantung and Hopeh Provinces. A warm and
raucous Chinese crowd welcomed the IIIAC Marines at Taku on September 30 during the initial
landings.6 Victory parades in Tientsin and Peiping underscored the celebratory sentiment
prevailing in China in early October 1945.7 This elation, however, proved to be short-lived; soon
Wonnacott and his fellow Marines found themselves with a front row seat to a renewed Chinese
Civil War. Just six days after their arrival, Marines came under fire from Chinese Communist
forces and suffered three casualties while guarding the railway 20 miles north of Tientsin. Six

“Ethel Wonnacott,” Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940. April 8, 1940. Stevens Township, Ravalli County,
Montana, Sheet 3B. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
5
“Gilbert E. Wonnacott,” U.S. Marine Corps Muster Rolls, July 1945. National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, D.C. PFC Wonnacott served with Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment.
6
Henry I. Shaw, The United States Marines in North China 1945-1949. (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps Historical
Branch, 1960). 3-5.
7
“Parade After Japanese Surrender, 1945,” John C. McQueen Collection, US Marine Corps History Division
Archives, Collection 64.
4
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thousand miles away in Stevensville, Montana, Ethel Wonnacott intently read newspaper stories
and letters from her son. Confused and incensed by a US intervention that seemed to make no
sense to her, Wonnacott became one of many mothers to engage in political action.
In October 1945, the political, economic, and military situation in North China was dire.
Ravaged by war since July 1937, China suffered perhaps as many as 20 million deaths in its
resistance to Japanese aggression and an additional 100 million people displaced.8 Famine,
pestilence, and the Japanese war effort brought North China into a deep depression, and runaway
inflation compounded the economic woe.9 As the internationally recognized National
government led by Chiang Kai-shek sought to reestablish sovereignty over the devastated region,
a resurgent Communist opposition, led by Mao Tse-tung, presented a formidable challenge.
Given these difficult circumstances, just what was the US interest in North China? Protecting
infrastructure? Enabling the Chinese Nationalist regime to reoccupy territory under Japanese
control ahead of advancing Chinese Communist forces? Fighting communist insurgents? Absent
a coherent message from political and military leaders in Washington, a vocal portion of the
American people recognized the potential for the US to get stuck in a quagmire.
American intervention in North China not only lacked the moral clarity of the Second
World War, it also conflicted with stated American foreign policy ideals of self-determination,
freedom, and democracy. In important ways, the intervention in North China exposed the limits
of American idealism in the post-war order to its domestic audience. The “Four Freedoms” and
the Atlantic Charter framed the US aims during World War II to the American public. Its citizens

Richard Bernstein, China 1945: Mao’s Revolution and America’s Fateful Choice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2014), 65-69.
9
James Chieh Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds. China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945 (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 203-204.
8
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fought to champion the values of freedom instead of tyranny; self-determination above
imperialism; and democracy over autocracy. The American people viewed the war as a battle
between good and evil—and the Americans were, according to anthropologist Margaret Mead,
“on the side of the Right.”10 This perception was deliberately reinforced by government
propaganda through the Office of War Information (OWI) and through the seven war loan
campaigns that used bonds, as Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. suggested, “to
sell the war, rather than vice versa.”11 During the war, Americans turned a blind eye to Allies of
convenience, most notably the Soviet Union, whose post-war political aims clashed mightily
with the United States. While closer in political alignment, the US and Great Britain also clashed
over the future of liberated colonies and the resumption of European empires.12 In the aftermath
of World War II, as these geopolitical pressures exposed the fissures in the grand alliance, it also
highlighted the more complicated realities to the American public. In the shadows of victory, the
black and white narrative of defeating despotic, evil regimes yielded to uncomfortable shades of
grey.
Victory was achieved at tremendous cost. Most notably, more than 405,000 Americans
were killed, over 72,000 were missing, and over 670,000 were wounded. Even families that did
not suffer direct losses likely knew someone who served personally, as over 12 percent of the US
population donned its nation’s uniform. Approximately 300,000 women joined the armed forces
and over 19 million women were employed by 1944—including a 141 percent increase in the

10

Allen M. Winkler, Home Front U.S.A. America During World War II, 3rd Ed. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson,
2012), 32-35.
11
James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 129.
12
Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), 429.
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manufacturing sector.13 Millions moved from agriculture to manufacturing, from the countryside
to cities, to the North and West. The massive wartime mobilization impacted almost every facet
of American society.
The wartime sacrifices also profoundly impacted American civic life. To win the war,
Americans tolerated the temporary suspension of democratic ideals for the larger purpose of
victory. The sacrifice of individual freedoms matched an overall pattern of subordination to the
greater war effort. Americans displayed their patriotism through price controls, “victory
gardens,” scrap metal drives, and volunteerism. They also acquiesced to a concentration of
power in the executive and the curtailment of individual rights. As Clinton Rossiter noted, “the
problems of civil liberty were . . . comparatively easy to solve” due to the American consensus
about the war’s paramount importance.14 This emergency interruption of due process and the
separation of powers, however, was not without consequence. The world’s foremost
constitutional democracy elected to use repressive methods during the war. Most egregiously,
Executive Order 9066 permitted—and the Supreme Court upheld—the forcible relocation and
internment of 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, including 79,000 American citizens.15
Americans embraced propaganda through the OWI and accepted the requirement for the
censorship of news. Sixteen million Americans served within an autocratic military structure and
experienced significant limits to their individual rights. The cherished freedom of speech, for
instance, was detrimental to good order and discipline in the uniformed ranks. In an environment
where inadvertent exposure of operational plans could yield drastic consequences, American

13

Winkler, Home Front U.S.A., 58-59.
Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013),
352-353.
15
Winkler, Home Front U.S.A., 86.
14
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servicemen understood the need for censorship.16 As such, communication with family, friends,
spouses, and lovers were reviewed, redacted, and occasionally blocked altogether.
At the conclusion of World War II, American citizens—including millions of deployed
servicemembers—reasserted the democratic freedoms they had sacrificed to win the war. The
American intervention in North China presented a ripe opportunity for civic restoration. With the
lifting of wartime censorship protocols, foreign correspondents painted word pictures for
American audiences freely. Although no formal censorship had existed for domestic newspapers
during the war, the federal government made efforts to restrict the flow of information to the
press. Self-censorship was promoted as a patriotic virtue during the war.17 After V-J day,
editorial boards opined on the intervention in North China without fear of reprisal or upsetting
the national war effort. The complexity of the Chinese Civil War bombarded the pages of
American periodicals without government filters. American GIs wrote letters home
unencumbered and engaged in political activism through contacting their representatives in
Congress, via local labor unions, or in letters to newspaper editors. With the surrender of the
Japanese, these young soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines rapidly sought to turn their swords
back into plowshares. In this sudden transformation, they became voters awaiting
demobilization—not a conquering army—and reminded their political leadership about
accountability at the ballot box. The Marines in North China had endured the savagery of
Okinawa with purpose but had neither received nor accepted the anti-communist logic of the
imminent Cold War. Their parents, spouses, and family members also stepped boldly back into

16

Sam Lebovic, Free Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom in America (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2016), 116-117. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with
Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985.) 452-453. The military term for this is “Operational Security,” designed to
deny enemy intelligence advanced warning of impending American plans. The OWI reduced this to a simple highly
proliferated phrase: “Loose lips sink ships.”
17
Lebovic, Free Speech and Unfree News, 112-113.
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the political fray. Eager to prevent further bloodshed—particularly to their loved ones—they
wrote congressional representatives, editorial boards, and President Truman and expressed their
opposition to the intervention in North China. Meanwhile, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) and local labor unions organized meetings in protest. Spouses, parents, and
organized groups repurposed the language that Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s OWI convinced
them that World War II was about: self-determination, freedom, and democracy.
In this reassertion of American democracy from the home front to North China,
congressional representatives served as a nexus of grass-roots political activism. Congressman
Mike Mansfield, a second term representative from Montana’s first district, exemplified the postwar reassertion of Congressional influence on American foreign policy. At an acute moment in
late 1945, Mansfield delivered three speeches in the House of Representatives critical of US
policy. Advocating withdrawal, Mansfield cautioned his colleagues that “if we decide to
intervene, which I pray that we do not, we must be prepared to maintain armed forces in China
for years to come.” The national angst over the Truman administration’s aims, according to
Mansfield, stemmed from “secrecy.” The “force of public opinion” should “serve as a reminder”
that only “the truth . . . will satisfy the American public at home and the American boys who are
being forced to do an unpleasant job in north China.”18 While Mansfield’s speeches reflected his
personal expertise about East Asia, they also included sentiments from a deluge of constituent
letters—including deployed Marines—that to Mansfield illustrated the “force of public
opinion.”19

“Our China Policy,” Congressional Record 91, December 11, 1945. 11852-11853.
“Demobilization, CBI,” Series IV, Box 26, Folders 5, 6, Mike Mansfield Papers, Archives and Special
Collections, Mansfield Library, University of Montana. (hereafter cited as Mansfield Papers).
18

19

6

In a crucial period from late 1945 to late 1946, an unlikely pairing of actors—Marines
and mothers—displayed agency, engaging in various forms of political activism to question US
involvement in the burgeoning Chinese civil war. Marines deployed in China contributed to
shaping the discourse of American foreign policy with their blunt assessments of conditions on
the ground. Simultaneously, as the visible agents of US power in China, Marine Corps officers
directing the deployment carefully and deliberately avoided a costly escalation that could have
trapped the United States as an active combatant in the Chinese civil war. The Marines’
families—especially mothers—wrote letters to congressmen, newspapers, and government
officials demanding an end to the mission in North China. While the Truman administration
faced a conundrum at the outset of the Chinese Civil War, Mansfield, Marines, and mothers
sought to galvanize the American public firmly against a de facto American intervention in
North China. In the wake of the Second World War, engaged citizens with a life-or-death stake
in the outcome reasserted themselves into the American democracy they had sacrificed to
preserve.
*

*

*

This thesis is the first scholarly exploration of the domestic and military politics
surrounding the US military intervention in North China after World War II. The state of the
field regarding the American intervention into North China is relatively thin. Intersecting several
historiographical fields, this event occupies a tangential position in existing military, foreign
relations, and Cold War scholarship. Even less explored is the nexus between domestic politics
and US-China policy at the conclusion of World War II.
This research into the deployment to North China contributes to the under-recorded
military history of small wars against non-state foes and low intensity conflict. Additionally, this

7

thesis views the Marines in China not as blunt instruments of national power, but as contingent
actors who sought to shape policy and to favorably interpret directives towards de-escalation. In
this statement, I do not intend to suggest that Marines in North China were either rogue or fully
autonomous, but rather that a significant range of interpretive freedom, particularly in late 1945,
existed for Marines in the III Amphibious Corps. Second, the Americans who primarily
interacted with key Chinese leaders throughout the strata of North China were in fact military
figures, rather than diplomats from the foreign service.20 Why was the deployment to North
China a seemingly forgotten historical event in US military history? The confines of
historiography itself is partially to blame. Occupations and political transitions are rarely
captured in scholarship—and only occasionally connected to the grand campaigns of war.
Narratives of the Second World War frequently conclude with the surrender on September 2,
1945.21 Lost in this periodization are the vital governance positions held by military figures
during substantive and lengthy occupations after World War II.22
This research builds upon American foreign relations histories by investigating the role of
domestic politics and deployed military influence in formulating US-China policy after World

20

This interpretation builds upon scholarship by Richard D. Challener and Robert L. Beisner, which touch upon the
roles of military officers in the development and execution of foreign policy.
21
Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944-1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 540. Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun, 560.
22
Scholarship regarding military occupations tends to focus on the top-level administrative roles served by military
figures, such as General Douglas MacArthur in Japan or General John Hodge in Korea. For this research, the
comparisons of Japan and Korea to North China serve to highlight the burdens facing military administration.
Substantial autonomy for military commanders—and the responsibility to make political choices—existed in all
three East Asian occupations. The official USMC history, Victory and Occupation, is notable in that it both includes
North China as a part of World War II and also surveys the roles everyday Marines experienced during the
intervention. For more on Japan and Korea, see: William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 18801964 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea, and the Far
East (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1951), Richard E. Lauterbach, “Hodge’s Korea,” The Virginia Quarterly
Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, 1947) and Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General
(Oxford University Press, 1989).
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War II. This leads to an exploration of the influence of Congress—specifically Representative
Mike Mansfield and his Montana constituents—on American foreign policy towards China. The
preeminent scholars in this field typically focus on the policy experts and major diplomatic
players. I deliberately expand this view to include Congress, the deployed Marines, and
American public opinion. Examining the constraints and impact of democracy, this research
supports the view that American foreign relations were a balance between political and practical
realities and argues against economic or imperialist determinism.
Historians have typically marked the beginning of the Cold War in 1945.23 This research
supports this periodization with an important caveat. While senior officials in the Truman
administration were well ensconced in the new Cold War mentality, Congress, the Marines in
China, and the American people writ large did not view China through a Cold War prism in
1945-1946. Furthermore, the Truman administration made no attempt to convince its citizens
otherwise. While checking Soviet power took precedence over anti-communism, overt American
assistance for the National Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek faced practical
domestic opposition. In the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, historians and politicians would
debate who “lost China” to the communist sphere, yet very little Cold War scholarship has
acknowledged the significant American combat power deployed to China in 1945.24
*

*

*

Organized both thematically and chronologically, this thesis examines the initial phase of
the intervention in North China from 1945 to 1946 through three primary lenses: political and
diplomatic actors shaping and setting strategy, military officers and enlisted men interpreting and

23

Caroline Pipe-Kennedy, The Origins of the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 2-4.
Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, The China Mission: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945-1947 (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co, 2018), 360-361.
24
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influencing policy, and finally the impact of public opinion and domestic politics on foreign
relations. While a relatively small number of Marines remained in North China until 1949, this
thesis focuses on the critical first four months from the end of the Pacific War with Japan until
the early weeks of the Marshall Mission in 1946. I contend that during this tumultuous period,
the US had a range of policy options in East Asia. It is tempting to wade into counterfactual
territory given the myriad of options available and debated in 1945. The purpose of this inquiry,
however, is to focus on the actors and contingent moments, their choices, and how events
unfolded over time. Rather than presenting a theme of inevitable expansion of US military roles
and missions, this thesis explores a debate about foreign policy choices within the broader
context of American democracy.
Chapter One, Changing of the Guard and Competing Interests, demonstrates that
President Truman and his top advisors had adopted a Cold War mindset prior to the cessation of
hostilities with Japan. Indeed, the very reason Marines were sent to North China and soldiers to
South Korea was Truman’s desire to limit the advance of the Soviet Far East Army’s occupation.
This chapter provides a brief overview of competing policy interests, the rapidly shifting military
landscape, and the sea change of leadership in 1945. The intent is not to conduct a deep analysis
of the sources of post-war planning, but rather to frame the events in North China in the proper
political and military context.
The second chapter, Congressman Mike Mansfield Sounds the Alarm and Seeks Answers,
surveys Mansfield’s largely unexplored role as the public face of early opposition to military
intervention in China and his substantial interaction with key actors in the Truman
administration. I argue that Mansfield elevated the Marine intervention in China as a political
issue in popular discourse. While Mansfield attempted to leverage his influence for an immediate

10

withdrawal of the IIIAC, his access to President Truman as well as in the State and War
Departments yielded few tangible policy results. Mansfield’s speeches, however, did resonate
with deployed Marines, their families, and organized citizens’ groups. Finally, I highlight
Mansfield’s voice—and the limited foreign policy debate in Congress—as an example of a
reversion to pre-war democratic norms.
The third chapter, Marines, Morale, and Mission: Military Voices, investigates how
Marines deployed to North China interpreted and influenced their mission. I argue that the
Marine Corps leaders resisted the expansion of their mission while carefully constraining the use
of force through strict rules of engagement. Additionally, I conclude that senior Marine officers
were prepared for the political nature of the North China operation due to extensive experience
in pre-war China and Latin America. The fine line of assistance to the Nationalist government
and neutrality in “civil strife” placed tremendous responsibility upon the American expeditionary
forces.25 This was a nuance intended—if not fully appreciated—by the leadership in
Washington.26 It would be up to the Marines of the IIIAC to strike, in the words of its
commanding general, this “difficult but essential” balance.27 This equilibrium was not well
understood by the rank and file Marines eager to return home. Speculation about their true
purpose in China promoted vocal political activism. The removal of wartime censorship
protocols in October 1945 enabled young, enlisted Marines to engage parents and congressmen
on the merits of the mission in North China.

25

Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Victory and Occupation: History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in
World War II, Vol. V (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968),569-570.
26
Marc S. Gallicchio, The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese
Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 100-101.
27
Frank and Shaw, Victory and Occupation, 570.
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The fourth chapter, Political Agents: Mothers, Wives, and Citizen Groups, explores the
role of public opinion and how domestic politics constrained foreign policy. I argue that the
families of deployed Marines—mothers and wives—as well as organized citizen groups formed
an effective public opposition to intervention in North China. The formal end of hostilities—V-J
Day—proved a watershed moment both practically and psychologically. Wartime protocols like
censorship and propaganda ended, and the public demanded rapid demobilization. Front page
stories about the perilous Chinese Civil War raised important questions about American post-war
aims in East Asia. Finally, I contend that the well-ingrained OWI messaging that underwrote
American sacrifices to defeat Japan provided both the logic and the language of opposition to
intervention in China.
In focusing on October 1945-January 1946, I have sought to emphasize the contingent
moments of US-China relations in transition. This transition existed across multiple planes from
Roosevelt to Truman, war to peace, Grand Alliance to Cold War, and anti-fascism to great power
rivalry. In this watershed period, the United States assumed the mantle of world leadership, but
many of its citizens were reluctant to assume the duties and costs of a global hegemon. Rather
than viewing deployed forces simply as blunt instruments of national power, this thesis
highlights the political agency, policy interpretation, and diplomatic influence of the citizen
Marines. Additionally, I have elected to explore the role of Congress, grass roots citizens, and
organized political groups in foreign policy discourse, rather than to focus on elite diplomatic
circles. This bottom-up approach sheds light upon how everyday citizens conceived of and
participated in American democracy. At the zenith of American political and economic power in
1945, informed public opinion steered the United States away from armed intervention in China.
This is a story about citizenship and activism. It is a story of American democracy.
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Figure 1: Occupation Plan for Imperial Japanese Held Territory 1945. Operation Beleaguer would be the responsibility of the
Marine III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) in China. Three X’s constitutes a Corps sized element (50-60,000), Two X’s a Division (1520,000). The Soviet Far East Army (not depicted) would occupy Manchuria and North Korea. Courtesy of Archival Branch, USMC
History Division.
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Chapter 1
Changing of the Guard and Competing Interests: the Genesis of Operation Beleaguer

Operation Beleaguer, the code name for the IIIAC occupation of North China, emerged
in a period of tremendous national and geopolitical transition. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
promotion of China as “the great Fourth Power in the world” frustrated Churchill, Stalin, and the
US military leadership.28 Unbeknownst to the public, at the Big Three summit meeting in Yalta
in February, 1945, a frail FDR secretly conceded to Stalin’s territorial demands in the Far East in
exchange for Soviet entry into the war against Japan and tacit support for China’s Nationalist
government. FDR would not live long enough to serve as the charismatic mediator in the
implementation of the Yalta accords as he envisioned.29 That role fell instead to a significantly
different personality—Harry S. Truman—at the dawn of the Cold War.
It was one thing rhetorically to support FDR’s vision of China as a world power, but
faced with an assertive Soviet Union and a sudden end to the war, Truman faced difficult choices
and the practical limitations of US strength. By the next meeting of the Big Three at the Potsdam
Conference in July, Truman suspected that recent Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe
foreshadowed Soviet aims in the Far East. Truman sought to minimize Russian expansion in East
Asia by shutting the Soviets out of the military occupation of Japan and by placing US troops on
the mainland in China and Korea.30 Furthermore, after V-J day, the new president was
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confronted by strong domestic political pressure to demobilize America’s armed forces rapidly
and a forthcoming midterm congressional election in 1946.31 FDR’s public speeches justified the
American sacrifice of men and material in a global struggle for freedom, self-determination, and
anti-imperialism. In fact, Roosevelt brokered secret agreements with Allies that had yet to
abandon the imperial order. FDR famously circumvented bureaucrats, but Truman now faced
War, Navy, and State departments with differing ideas about how to occupy Japanese territory.32
As the Pacific War came to a sudden end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) rushed to issue orders,
establish boundaries, and to cope with conflicting priorities.
Operations Blacklist, Campus, and Beleaguer, the occupations of Japan, South Korea,
and North China, all competed for limited resources—especially troops and sealift. After debate
among the services and theater commanders, the JCS prioritized first Japan, then Korea, and
finally China. Until the eleventh hour, an American occupation of the key port of Dairen in
Manchuria was in play. With the devil in the details, field grade officers in the Pentagon would
establish boundaries that sought to reconcile political directives with military realities, such as
the 38th Parallel which would divide the US and Soviet zones of occupation in Korea.33 On
August 9, the Soviets entered the Pacific War and the second atomic bomb destroyed Nagasaki.
The next day, Japan broadcast its intent to surrender. The race to the mainland and a contest to
shape a new order for East Asia was on.
While countering Soviet ambitions drove Truman to commit forces to mainland Asia and
deny Stalin an occupation zone in Hokkaido, supporting the Chinese Nationalist government
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emerged as an important element of US policy.34 Keenly aware of the growing tension between
the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, General Albert Wedemeyer, commanding general of
US Forces China and advisor to Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, requested six
American divisions to stabilize North and Central China. With insufficient occupation forces to
meet demand, the JCS accommodated Truman’s intent by seizing key ports and terrain in North
China with the Marines of the IIIAC.35 Prioritized last for sealift, the IIIAC deployed in late
September. In the lull of August-September, Mao Tse-tung responded to the long-anticipated
Soviet invasion of Manchuria, by redeploying his Communist forces to North China and
Manchuria.36 Directed by the JCS, Wedemeyer made US sea and air lift available for nearly
500,000 Nationalist troops to ports and airfields secured by the IIIAC.37 While what turned out to
be fruitless high-level negotiations in Chungking between Chiang and Mao were taking place,
the scene for a renewed Chinese Civil War was being set in the northeast. Behind closed doors,
factions within the Truman administration viewed the IIIAC as an answer to meet different
policy aims ranging from checking Soviet ambition to reasserting Nationalist sovereignty. The
landing of the IIIAC in North China came as a surprise to the American public. Absent a formal
announcement from the Truman administration, as newspapers reported the Marine landings in
October, diplomats, politicians, Marines, and the American public wondered aloud: just exactly
what were the Marines doing in North China?
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Chapter 2
Congressman Mike Mansfield Sounds the Alarm and Seeks Answers
(October-December 1945)
One congressman’s clear and credible voice stood out immediately in opposition to US
intervention in North China: Mike Mansfield’s. From October to December 1945, Representative
Mansfield, of Montana’s first congressional district, carried out a veritable media and policy blitz
in the halls of Congress, in the State Department, and in print and broadcast media. A member of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mansfield sensed strategic confusion and bureaucratic
dysfunction lurking behind America’s China policy.38 The Montana Democrat publicly
expressed his frustration on the House floor and in public appearances in early October 1945.
“What is our policy in the Far East going to be? This is a question which I have been mulling
over in my mind ever since the surrender of Japan, and to date, except for our policy in Japan, I
have been unable to find the answer.”39
In the week following the first Marine landing, Mansfield was one of the first
government officials to highlight the potential for war. Appearing as a panelist for the Foreign
Policy Association on October 9, Mansfield took a pragmatic stance against an enhanced
American empire. Recalling an interventionist era when Marines landed to defend US business
interests in China and Latin America, Mansfield emphatically stated that “the policy of
imperialism . . . must be a thing of the past.” 40 Furthermore, if the United States were to keep
troops in liberated areas, what would prevent the Soviets or British from doing the same? If
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nothing else, the presence of Marines in China undermined American rhetoric supporting selfdetermination in the former Japanese empire with its British, French, and Soviet allies.
In a speech before the House on October 11, Mansfield reminded his fellow
congressmen—and the newspapers he knew would print his words—of China’s domestic
volatility.41 The fact that Marines’ boots were already on the ground in North China added to the
urgency of the day. Not surprisingly, the former Marine Corps private intently focused on the
anticipated quandary the Marines would face with the renewal of a Chinese Civil War. Mansfield
noted that “the landing of the First and Sixth Marine Divisions . . . constitute an unwarranted
interference in the affairs of China . . . the Shantung and Hopeh provinces contain sizeable
Communist elements . . . and in that area we might be unable to maintain a hands-off policy.”
Mansfield recommended a rapid withdrawal, fearful of a creeping political role for the
Leathernecks in the unpredictable Chinese morass. Following a series of questions from
colleagues in the House, Mansfield further clarified “I do object to two Marine Divisions being
sent up to North China, because I’m afraid we may become involved too much in China’s
internal affairs. We should be extremely careful.”42
Mansfield’s speech of October 11 was printed in newspapers around the world, but he
also set his sights on persuading key policy makers in the State Department. Visiting the Director
of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, on October 15, Mansfield reiterated
his deep concerns about a lengthy presence of the Marines in North China and emphasized his
“fear that the Soviet Union” might postpone withdrawal from Manchuria as a result. Vincent
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presented Mansfield with an official letter to Congressman Hugh DeLacy stating that “our armed
forces are in China not for the purpose of assisting any Chinese faction or group.” After reading
the letter, Vincent noted that “the explanation…did not satisfy” Mansfield.43 In a memorandum
to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Vincent proposed that Acheson prompt the
Secretaries of War and the Navy to make public statements that the Marines “would be
withdrawn as soon as they [could] be relieved by Chinese Government Forces.”44 Vincent clearly
held similar views to Mansfield. While imploring that the State Department determine the
proposed plans by the War Department and place the matter “before the President,” Vincent
wrote that “the picture of American troops putting down civil disorder in China is not, of course,
a pretty one.”45 When confirmation of the proposed landings arrived on September 27, Vincent
again pleaded for a Presidential decision. He opined that “unless there are over-riding military
reasons for carrying out these dispositions of Marines, the plan should be abandoned in favor of
occupation by Chinese troops.”46 In Mansfield, Vincent found an ally who not only agreed with
Vincent’s position but was a willing partner unencumbered by bureaucratic media protocols.
Mansfield would be the public voice that Vincent could not.
The same day Vincent met with Mansfield, Acheson received a cable from Chungking
emphasizing the benefits of the Marine presence for Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government.
Despite awareness of heightened Chinese Communist ire towards the United States, the
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American diplomatic mission in China was nevertheless pleased that Marines were tipping the
balance towards the Nationalists. This was especially noticeable in the major cities like Peiping,
where the III Amphibious Corps’ garrison induced the Communists’ troops to withdraw. The US
military attaché happily reported that “Chinese Communists are no match for Central
Government troops acting with American assistance.”47 Mansfield’s meeting with State
Department officials and speech on October 11 may have influenced the State Department
internal deliberations about China policy—and bolstered Vincent’s position vis-à-vis that of the
American mission in Chungking.
The debate about US-China policy entered an important phase in the autumn of 1945.
Mansfield’s speech occurred in the wake of the London Foreign Ministers Conference, where
significant friction between Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov emerged about the future of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
role in the Far East.48 Mansfield’s anti-interventionist speech was printed in the Soviet
newspaper Izvestiya on October 16, and Ambassador Averell Harriman cabled Mansfield’s retranslated speech to the Secretary of State—and to Chungking.49 The state-controlled Soviet
press found Mansfield’s position favorable to Soviet interests—which gave American diplomats
understandable pause. The Marines in North China were already pawns in a geo-political Cold
War chess game that few Americans in October 1945 knew about—let alone understood.
Like Vincent, Mansfield feared that the top officials in the Truman administration, did
not fundamentally understand the danger lurking in North China. Mansfield was convinced that
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his resume and reputation as “an expert on the Far East,” would present an opportunity to
directly educate and influence President Truman.50 In the previous administration, Mansfield
sought out—and was granted—a high-profile role as Roosevelt’s personal emissary to China.
Just after the 1944 election, FDR sent the freshman congressman to China where Mansfield met
with key Chinese and American officials in Chungking including Chiang Kai-shek, Ambassador
Patrick Hurley, and General Albert Wedemeyer.51 Upon returning to Washington in January
1945, Mansfield personally presented his “China Mission Report” to President Roosevelt,
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, and General George C. Marshall.52 Following FDR’s death
in April, a new president, a new Secretary of State, and new presidential aides complicated
Mansfield’s access. As luck would have it, Mansfield was at the White House with President
Truman when news of the Japanese surrender was announced in August 1945. In that meeting,
Mansfield asked for a chance to reprise his role as a special presidential envoy to China, but the
new president declined. Mansfield knew that President Truman was a novice in foreign affairs
and was paper thin on East Asia. Despite his early rebuff from President Truman, Mansfield was
determined to regain personal access to the President—even more so when 53,000 Marines
landed in North China.53
While trying to get on the President’s calendar, Mansfield returned to Congress on
October 30 and delivered another speech critical of the Truman administration’s deployment of
Marines. Mansfield declared to the House that a Chinese “civil war is in progress,” and that
“marines have already been wounded in the province of Shantung because of the fighting
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between Chinese elements.” Mansfield again called for an unequivocal withdrawal from North
China not just on the basis of projected risk, but on hard-earned credit for fighting World War II.
“These men,” he said, “have done their job in the Pacific and the best policy for us would be to
bring them home to their country and their loved ones.”54 As Mansfield spoke, Consul Paul
Meyer, from Tientsin, cabled to administration officials an alternate view of the important
stabilizing role Marines played in the key railroad city. Meyer noted that the “mission of
American Marines . . . daily takes on more of a political aspect” and that “this development is
natural and unavoidable . . . and presumably was contemplated when the Marines were sent in
here.” 55 Meyer’s recommendation of preserving the Marine presence in China stood in stark
contrast to Mansfield’s, revealing the complicated risk balance the Truman administration faced.
All options presented risks.
By the first week of November, headlines like: “Yank Intervention Charged by Reds”
appeared nationwide.56 After a month of speeches, press events, and State Department meetings,
Mansfield took his case directly to Truman and reminded the President about “our fundamental
policy of non-interference.” In a letter on November 7, Mansfield wrote the President that “The
sending in of over 50,000 United States Marines to North China . . . is, in my opinion, potentially
explosive. . . our forces are caught in a situation not of their making and one which may involve
us unwittingly.” Mansfield raised the specter of public opinion and appealed to the President’s
political sense noting that “it will cause trouble here at home as the American people have no
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desire for their boys to become involved in another country’s troubles.” Finally, Mansfield
introduced Truman to indications of low troop morale: “I have received hundreds of letters in the
past month from servicemen in Asia and the feeling on their part is one of great discontent.
These men have done their job and the best policy for us would be to bring them home.” 57
Truman granted Mansfield a White House meeting about China policy three weeks later, but the
Truman administration moved immediately to calm the growing clamor raised by Mansfield and
a skeptical public. In early November, Secretary of State Byrnes held a press conference and
announced that “the United States is planning to withdraw its Marines from hot spots in
China.”58 Byrnes’ statement may have bought some time for Truman’s plans to mature, but the
deteriorating conditions in North China prevented a hasty withdrawal. The burden of pursuing a
more nuanced US policy in the Far East would fall upon the shoulders of the Third Amphibious
Corps.
After the initial wave of public response in early November, some in Congress and in
print media attempted to justify American intervention in China. One prominent congressman,
Dr. Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minnesota, emerged as a counter voice to Mansfield in the
House. Judd spoke with definite credibility on military issues and China policy. Judd served—
like Truman—as an Army artillery officer in combat during World War I. From 1925-1931, Judd
worked as a medical missionary in South China, returning to the United States only because of
complications from malaria. From 1934-1938, Dr. Judd worked in North China, where he
witnessed firsthand the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Japanese invasion. Elected to
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Congress in 1942, Judd frequently spoke about US-China relations.59 On November 20, Judd
sensed that despite winning the war, the US was in danger of losing the peace in China. Judd
asked the House, “Are we now to throw away that hard-bought military victory by abandoning
China?” Judd acknowledged the public “confusion” about US policy and countered that “our
own obligations and interests” in China “are not nebulous or divided” but “clear and
compelling.”60 Judd concluded his speech by citing a Life magazine article titled “China: What
Price Peace.” Life also recognized the “cry” from the deployed Marines and that “mass meetings
are held, and United States newspapers editorially demand that we quit China” while “families
cry, ‘why aren’t our boys back home?’” Dismissing the wave of public opinion as
“oversensitivity” and due partly to “Communist propaganda,” Life called for “calm and
courageous American public opinion” to “support the legitimate government of China with all
our heart and soul.”61
A Portland, Oregon trip to Congressman James Mott’s funeral and congressional hearings
about atomic energy occupied Mike Mansfield’s public calendar in mid-November, but China
policy remained foremost on his mind.62 The principal reason for Mansfield’s sudden public
silence about US-Chinese relations, however, was due to a growing unease with Communistassociated political committees and newspapers that were using Mansfield’s speeches
frequently.63
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Other Congressmen, most notably Hugh DeLacy from Seattle, ratcheted up the antiinterventionist rhetoric in late November. DeLacy, however, was strongly associated with
Communist front organizations and “left a red mark on the hill” with a record that “read like the
case history of a fellow traveler.”64 In a speech to the House on November 26, DeLacy not only
criticized the Marines “being used to suppress the aspirations of millions for a new democracy,”
but also excoriated the top US military and diplomatic officers in China. Rogue officers
committed war crimes, according to DeLacy, with “neither moral nor political authority.” The
US was “so thoroughly committed to armed intervention,” DeLacy opined, that General Albert
C. Wedemeyer “authorized air attacks upon a tiny Chinese village . . . in retaliation for a few
rifle shots at a train.” As covered in more detail in chapter three, DeLacy’s description of the
incident implied an escalation of disproportionate force, instead of the remarkable discipline and
restraint that had actually occurred. DeLacy, however, reserved his harshest criticism for
Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley and noted that Hurley’s actions “made the present civil war
unavoidable” and “committed us to armed intervention.” DeLacy contrasted US actions with
“the lofty principles” articulated by the late FDR and placed the blame at the feet of Hurley and
Wedemeyer, choosing to leave President Truman out of his remarks. The most explosive
language, however, addressed Hurley’s alleged treatment of foreign service officers. DeLacy
stated that “Hurley purged able China experts with long records of service who were critical of
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his policies.”65 Without calling outright for Hurley’s resignation, DeLacy made it clear that
Hurley was the problem and that State Department experts advocated a different approach.
The same day DeLacy harshly criticized Hurley in Congress, Mansfield and Hurley met
for a private meeting. Mansfield sought to share his concerns about the dangers lurking in North
China and likely hoped to influence Hurley to support a path for withdrawal of the Marines.
Before much policy could be discussed, however, Hurley stunned Mansfield with news that
radically altered the agenda. Hurley had resigned his ambassadorship due to illness that morning.
Hurley further informed Mansfield that he had recommended Mansfield as the best possible
choice to serve as his ambassadorial replacement to both President Truman and Secretary
Byrnes. Hurley’s reasoning was simple. Mansfield “was the only Congressman who had gone to
China, who kept his mouth shut and made no enemies.”66
Despite the development of unwelcome Communist activists using his words, Mansfield
had good reason for optimism as he entered the White House on November 27; he likely thought
he would be returning to China as a Presidential envoy. The date of Mansfield’s White House
meeting coincided with an amplification in the China policy crisis: the very public resignation of
Ambassador Hurley. Rather than citing health reasons, Ambassador Hurley lambasted US policy
towards China as somehow supporting both “imperialism and Communism” and added that “the
Hydra-headed direction and confusion of our foreign policy in Washington during the late war is
chargeable to the weakness of our Foreign Service.”67 When Hurley learned of DeLacy’s

Hugh DeLacy, “Return of United States Troops from China,” Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session,
Vol. 91, Part 8, November 26, 1945. 10993-10995
66
Meeting with Ambassador Patrick Hurley, Personal Memorandum, November 26, 1945. Series XIX, Box 511,
Folder 2. Mansfield Papers.
67
The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to President Truman, November 26, 1945. FRUS, China, Document 530.
65

26

comments, particularly the detail that likely came from State Department leaks, Hurley angrily
and publicly changed tactics.
Mansfield agreed that the administration’s foreign policy was confusing, but he did not
ascribe the blame to the professional diplomats. The hunt for “Communist spies” in the State
Department that Senator Joseph McCarthy would famously weaponize in the coming years was
heralded by Hurley’s resignation letter and the explosive Congressional hearings that followed.68
It is interesting that DeLacy—an actual Communist—did possess sensitive inside details from
State Department sources and likely incited Hurley’s response.69 Mansfield sought to deescalate
the polarized rhetoric and to seek a moderate tone. Mansfield publicly commended Ambassador
Hurley and simultaneously defended the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service members “who
are made the butt of attacks” and “have little opportunity to defend themselves” were extremely
appreciative of Mansfield’s support. One wrote: “May we prove worthy of such a generous and
fair-minded champion!”70
In his much-anticipated one-on-one audience with President Truman on November 27,
Mansfield must have quickly ascertained that no second presidential mission was in store for
him. Instead, that morning, Mansfield discovered a president primarily concerned with Soviet
expansion and influence. After Mansfield reiterated his belief that the presence of Marines made
involvement in the Chinese Civil War probable, he argued for a definitive withdrawal date for
the Marines. President Truman replied in his characteristically blunt Missouri fashion: “I cannot
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do that. The situation is over there is more serious than most people know. We have promised to
back Chiang Kai-shek and we will.” Sensing that the President was committed to support
Chiang, Mansfield pivoted to recommendations for indirect support and pleaded with the
President to be candid and straightforward with the American public about U.S. foreign policy.71
President Truman made no direct reply to Mansfield’s suggestions, although he added that
China’s Nationalist Government trusted “only us and we got [sic] to carry the commitments
through to the finish.”72 One key US-China policy change did, however, emerge immediately
after the Mansfield meeting at the White House. Later that afternoon, President Truman called
General George C. Marshall at his home in Leesburg, Virginia and asked him to serve as his
“Special Ambassadorial Envoy to China.” The quintessential five-star public servant made no
attempt to extend his one-day old retirement, replying only with “Yes, Mr. President.”73
While Mansfield was likely disappointed not to be tapped as ambassador, he sought to
influence Marshall with information from the China report Mansfield wrote in January. The
second-term congressman’s audacity was fully on display as Mansfield wrote to Marshall—a
man more than twenty years his senior who possessed a towering reputation—the following day
to offer both his public support and his private counsel. Mansfield implored Marshall to benefit
from his own experience by looking “over once again the copy of the report I made to President
Roosevelt on my return from China in January of this year.”74 Mansfield praised the choice of
General Marshall to Secretary of State Byrnes, stating that “No finer choice could have been
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made . . . he has the tact, diplomacy, and courage necessary to overcome the difficulties he will
face.”75
As General Marshall prepared for his new assignment, he balanced his time with
congressional testimony about the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. Most of Congress was looking
back at the embarrassing beginning of the war, but Mansfield attempted to steer the House of
Representatives forward to China policy in a speech he gave on December 11, 1945. Despite his
meetings with the State Department and the President, Mansfield sensed that a passive Congress
was sleeping while American policy threatened to plunge the United States unwittingly into
another conflict. After a lengthy review of Ambassador Hurley’s tenure in China and endorsing
Marshall, Mansfield turned to the de facto intervention in China and America’s options:
The real issue in China, in the minds of the American people, is intervention. We
have two choices, either intervene all the way or get out by a definite date. If we
decide to intervene, which I pray we do not, we must be prepared to maintain
armed forces in China for years to come because the present situation will not, of
course be cleared up overnight. We must act promptly to clarify our policy so that
we may know, as far as possible, just what is going on, why it is being done, and
what we hope to accomplish.76
Mansfield then shifted to the United States’ long-standing “Open Door” policy in the
emerging Cold War context, and of the need to explain its foreign policy to its skeptical
citizens:
We must not develop an “iron curtain” of our own. We must continue to uphold
America’s traditional China policy of non-intervention in her internal
affairs...There has been no need for secrecy…and the results achieved by our
postwar China policy should serve as a reminder to us that the truth and the truth
only will satisfy the American public at home and the American boys who are
being forced to do an unpleasant job in north China today.77
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At the conclusion of the speech, Mansfield took questions from House Majority leader John
McCormack, holding firm to a policy of non-intervention.
McCormack: Does the gentleman admit that it is of vital importance to our
country for generations to come that the friendship…between China and America
be cemented as closely as possible?
Mansfield: I certainly do, but that friendship will not be implemented through the
dispatching of expeditionary forces to China.
As McCormack demonstrated, appeals to Chinese friendship, unity, and national interests all
blurred US policy towards China and provided openings to expand the Marines’ mission to a
more direct form of participation in Chinese internal affairs. Mansfield’s voice in opposition to
intervention in China was constant, consistent, and clear—even if the Truman administration was
anything but.
The same day Mansfield spoke in Congress about America’s China policy, President
Truman, General Marshall, Secretary of State Byrnes, and Chief of Staff Admiral William D.
Leahy gathered at the White House to discuss Marshall’s mission. In Marshall’s hand was a
written directive that “U.S. support will not extend to U.S. military intervention to influence the
course of any Chinese internal strife,” but Marshall’s charge was to deliver a “strong, peaceful,
united, and democratic China.” The President was counting on Marshall to achieve “political
unity before our troops leave China,” which implied either a lengthy stay for the North China
Marines or a miracle. Ever the unflappable public servant, General Marshall prodded the
President for the limits of his ability to pressure Chiang Kai-shek in the negotiation. The
President was clear. When push came to shove, Marshall would have to “continue to back the
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National Government” no matter how little Chiang cooperated.78 On one hand, Truman selected
perhaps the most universally respected, apolitical figure possible to attempt to broker peace in
China between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and Mao Tse-tung’s Communists. On the other
hand, the President equipped Marshall with little real diplomatic leverage, and success was
contingent upon the behavior of the firmly entrenched Chinese parties.
General Marshall set off to China from National Airport armed with little but hope. As
the C-54 lumbered airborne, the diplomat John Carter Vincent prayerfully told his son: “there
goes the bravest man in the world. He’s going to try to unify China.”79 The country professed
great faith in Marshall to be sure. His mission would seek to bridge the deep domestic divisions
of China and to unite the country as Roosevelt once dreamed. Despite Mansfield and Vincent’s
pleas, the Marines of the III Amphibious Corps would remain in North China for the foreseeable
future. In large measure, the IIIAC sought to control its own fate and avoid direct participation in
the Chinese Civil War.
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Figure 3: An accurate depiction of areas of control in November 1945. Note the recognition of both US assistance to Chinese
Nationalist troops and the warring factions. Images like this made it difficult for the Truman administration to explain the role of
Marines in North China to the American public. Time, November 12, 1945.
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Chapter 3
Marines, Morale, and Mission: Military Voices (1945-1946)
Ugly rumors circulated that we would hit Japan next, with an expected casualty
figure of one million Americans. No one wanted to talk about that…then on 15
August the war ended. We received the news with quiet disbelief coupled with an
indescribable sense of relief. We thought the Japanese would never surrender.
Many refused to believe it. Sitting in stunned silence, we remembered our dead.
So many dead. So many maimed. So many bright futures consigned to the ashes
of the past. So many dreams lost in the madness that had engulfed us. Except for a
few widely scattered shouts of joy, the survivors of the abyss sat hollow-eyed and
silent, trying to comprehend a world without war.80
-Corporal Eugene B. Sledge, 1st Marine Division, III Amphibious Corps

Deployed to North China in October 1945, the Marines of the III Amphibious Corps
(IIIAC) implemented a more limited American policy by resisting the expansion of their mission
and restraining the use of force. They also wrote home in exasperated frustration. Operation
Beleaguer tasked the IIIAC with seizing key ports, railheads, airfields, and cities in North China
to accept the “local surrender of Japanese forces,” and “to cooperate with Chinese Central
Government Forces,” while “avoiding collaboration” with “forces opposing the Central
government.”81 The IIIAC, commanded by Major General Keller E. Rockey, primarily
comprised the First and Sixth Marine Divisions as well as the First Marine Aircraft Wing. All
told, the veteran 53,000-man IIIAC brought a formidable, full-spectrum combat force of tanks,
fighter aircraft, artillery, and infantry to North China. Despite the Marines’ advantages in
firepower and equipment, they were heavily outnumbered in North China by the presence of
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Japanese soldiers (326,000), Chinese “puppet” troops under Japanese control (480,000), and at
least 170,000 Communist Chinese forces.82 Exactly how these disparate elements would interact
was unclear. Only time would tell whether the Americans would be welcomed as liberators or
shunned as invaders by the scores of millions of liberated war-weary Chinese. As confused as the
mission and environment seemed to Marine senior officers like General Rockey, the young,
enlisted Marines were even more in the dark. The American troops’ morale, peaked by
America’s and its allies’ sudden victory in August, quickly evaporated by late 1945, and they
sounded off in letters home and in protest meetings throughout the Pacific declaring that “the
war is over, bring us home!”83 Armed with pens and newly freed from wartime censorship,
citizen soldiers participated in the democracy they had fought to defend.

Figure 2: IIIAC Operations Area of Shantung and Hopeh Provinces. The Marines would secure key ports, cities, and railways. The
Soviet Far East Army occupied neighboring Manchuria (Jehol, Liaoning Provinces). 1945. Courtesy of Archival Branch, U.S.
Marine Corps History Division.
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In North China, senior leaders and staff of the IIIAC sought to minimize expansion of
their mission beyond simply disarming and repatriating the Japanese. The temptation to serve as
facilitators for the Chinese Nationalist forces persisted throughout the Marines’ time in North
China. While the Marine leaders accepted the Truman administration’s preference for a “strong,
peaceful, united, and democratic China” under Chiang Kai-shek, they also recognized that
American policy would hinge largely upon the Communist response. 84 Avoiding an outright
confrontation required a careful set of directives understood by the lowliest rifleman. Shaped by
experienced leaders, the Marines established and maintained a baseline policy of noninvolvement and risk mitigation through skillful negotiation and strict rules of engagement.
General Rockey and his senior officers immediately recognized that the Communists
desired to maintain their positional advantage and would resist the deployment of Nationalist
forces. Fortunately, the Marine leadership was experienced not only in recent combat, but also in
occupation duty before the war. Of the eight generals in the IIIAC, only Rockey had never been
stationed in China; although he had served with distinction in the occupations of both Nicaragua
and Haiti.85 Perhaps the most seasoned “China Hand” was Brigadier General William A.
Worton, Rockey’s Chief of Staff. A Chinese speaker with more than twelve years of China
experience, Worton coordinated the advanced party and identified the key locations where the
Marines would deploy and billet.86 In late September, Worton was contacted by “the people
opposed to Chiang Kai-shek.” General Chou En-lai arrived for a tense negotiation and informed
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Worton that the Communist troops would fight the Marines if they attempted to occupy Peiping.
Unfazed, Worton coolly informed Chou that the highly trained IIIAC would sweep aside any
force the Communists could muster. Noting the Marines’ superior firepower, maneuverability,
and airpower, Worton concluded the tense meeting by informing Chou exactly how the Marines
could easily occupy Peiping. Chou replied that “he would get the Marines orders changed.” This
was possible as Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek were negotiating in Chungking.87 At this
pivotal moment in North China, Chou and Mao chose not to resist the Marines’ advance in
force.88 Mao opted instead for a strategy of information warfare “designed to arouse public
opinion” in the United States and China against American support for Chiang.89
Marine and Navy senior leaders also sought to avoid direct confrontation with
Communists by carefully selecting operating areas and by establishing strict rules of
engagement. The governing order stated that the mission “is one of assisting a friendly nation in
the discharge of a large and complex task. In accomplishing this task every effort must be made
to limit our participation to one of an advisory and liaison nature.”90 This policy was tested at the
outset at Chefoo in Shantung province, where an intended landing site quickly proved a point of
friction. When local Communists seized the port before Americans could land, the Navy-Marine
Corps leadership faced a dilemma: put ashore and assert American authority in the name of the
Chinese Nationalist government or cede the territory to the Communists. In this context, 7th Fleet
Commander Admiral Daniel E. Barbey and General Rockey met aboard the USS Catoctin just
off-shore Chefoo on October 7 and weighed their options. While General Lemuel C. Shephard’s
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6th Division could easily have secured the port by force, Rockey decided to avoid the potential
conflict and instead to land the Division at Tsingtao. Rockey later recalled that Chiang was
furious about this decision during a face-to-face meeting in November.91 Rockey, however, was
quite comfortable with his decision for reasons he made clear in a letter on October 13 to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alexander A. Vandegrift. “Admiral Barbey and I,”
Rockey wrote, “both felt that any landing there would be an interference in the internal affairs of
China; that it would be bitterly resented by the Communists and that there would probably be
serious repercussions.”92 Rockey’s caution contrasted with that of his chief of staff Worton, who
had stared down Chou just days before. Perhaps Rockey was shaped by his personal experience
in Latin America. In 1928, as a young Major, he earned his second Navy Cross while fighting a
tough counterinsurgency in Nicaragua. Rockey was reluctant to place his Marines in a similar
position.93
One of the principal ways individual Marines resisted participation in the growing
Chinese Civil War was through strict rules of engagement. Faced with persistent threats,
firefights, casualties, and abductions, Marines sought creative ways to use limited and
proportionate force to deescalate perilous confrontations. Non-lethal shows of air power, smaller
tactical maneuver elements, and limited armament were some of the techniques Marines used to
avoid larger clashes with the ubiquitous Communists.94
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On October 6, Marines came under fire while attempting to clear roadblocks twenty-two
miles northwest of Tientsin. Not coincidentally, that same day the 92nd Chinese Nationalist Army
began to arrive in Peiping via American aircraft. Despite taking three casualties and returning
small arms fire, the 1st Marine Regiment refrained from the use of supporting artillery and
temporarily withdrew in good order. The following day, the Marines incorporated a visible
“show of force” with tanks and fighter aircraft, allowing the road to the ancient capital of Peiping
to be cleared without further bloodshed.95 Marines routinely employed aircraft as a “show of
force,” a non-lethal innovation designed to demonstrate control and improve reconnaissance
across the massive operating area.
The mission of these aircraft—like so many of the Marines’ recent Chinese
experiences—was perplexing to some. One Corporal wrote that “for almost three days our
airplanes flew in formation back and forth and had there been any trouble they would of [sic] not
been able to drop bombs on Chinese people.” This was not a cynical “glory hunt” as he supposed
and described it, but instead a deliberate tactical choice to limit the use of force and avoid
escalation. Coincidentally, this Marine belonged to the 29th Marine Regiment that had
disembarked at Tsingtao due to the potential Communist threat at Chefoo. The Corporal noted
that “luckily the trouble between the Chinese was to [sic] hot so we was put here into Tsingtao…now we are doing nothing except stand guard duty over our own camp.”96 The relative
boredom of the Marines in Shantung was a good problem to have in late 1945.
As the Marines in Hopeh province defended key trestles and junctions of the critical
railway, the Communists began to sabotage the tracks and challenge the small, remote Marine
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units in coordinated attacks with mines and harassing small arms fire. Even generals traveling by
train were not immune. Visiting his widely spread-out forces along the Tangku-Chinwangtao
railway, Major General DeWitt Peck, commander of the 1st Marine Division, came under attack
on November 14. After the rail lines were blown in front of the train, rifle fire poured onto Peck
and his escort Marines from an adjacent village. Returning fire and maneuvering for cover, Peck
worked his way to the radio jeep tied down on a flat car. Radioing for reinforcements, Peck also
contacted General Rockey and requested immediate close air support. Interestingly, the aircraft
sortied from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were to be loaded with “ammunition only” and not
equipped with bombs—something the Wing commander protested. Communist fire broke off
before the aircraft arrived, preventing a potentially difficult decision. In subsequent messages
between Rockey and Army General Albert Wedemeyer, commander of all US forces in China,
Rockey “indicated that he was ready to authorize a strafing mission if fire continued from the
offending village.” While the considerable restraint shown by Peck and Rockey’s proportional
response of strafing rather than bombing was itself notable, Wedemeyer raised the stakes further.
In a message to Rockey, Wedemeyer wrote: “If American lives are endangered…it is desired
that you inform the military leader or responsible authority in that village in writing that such
firing must be stopped. After ensuring that your warning...has been received and understood,
should firing continue, you are authorized to take appropriate action for their protection.”97 Such
restrictive rules of engagement placed Marines at tremendous risk, but also underlined the extent
to which military leaders went to avoid greater involvement in the Chinese Civil War.
The restrictive rules of engagement would be tested continuously during the Marines’
tenure in North China in numerous small firefights, but none in 1945 gained the attention of the
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American public like the Anshan incident. On December 4, suspected Communists shot two
Marines in the countryside.98 One Marine succumbed to his wounds and the second Marine
survived by playing dead—despite being shot a second time at point blank range. The wounded
man slowly crawled back to his post and relayed the story to his chain-of-command. In response,
a light infantry force from 1st Battalion, 29th Marines set out to confront the perpetrators in the
small village of Anshan. Approaching the village near nightfall, the patrol established a mortar
position, and then sought out the local leadership with an interpreter’s help. To this point, they
precisely followed Wedemeyer’s directive. The young officer leading the patrol told the village
leaders “to surrender the murderers within a half hour” or else the village would be shelled. After
a tense thirty minutes expired and no one surrendered, the Marines fired “24 rounds of high
explosive and one of white phosphorus” towards the village perimeter. No one was killed by the
shelling, and little physical damage occurred.
Nevertheless, American journalists reported a salacious version that alleged commission
of a war crime.99 Articles like “Marines Shell Village in North China” ran across the
country.100A particularly harsh editorial in the Washington Post on December 12 titled “Semper
Fidelis,” elicited a rare letter to the editor in response from the Commandant, General Vandegrift
on December 14. The Washington Post asked “to what values are the United States Marines
forever faithful?” before expressing “shock and shame” at the report of the shelling. The editorial
implied that the Marines had committed a war crime like Nazi Germany and that “from the point
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of view of the Chinese…it is perhaps indistinguishable from the kind of civilization brought to
them by the Japanese.”101
Congressman Mike Mansfield noted the Washington Post editorial and asked Vandegrift
for a copy of the investigative report. Mansfield viewed the Anshan incident as a prime example
of the unintended consequences of deploying Marines in China that could only worsen as the
Chinese civil war expanded.102 Vandegrift completed the inquiry and sent a copy to Mansfield as
well as the copy of a four-page rebuttal letter to Eugene Meyer, publisher of the Washington
Post. Vandegrift noted that only “two windowpanes” were damaged and that the rounds were
carefully “placed outside” the village walls. Vandegrift then concluded that “in a delicate and
confusing situation [the Marines in China] have performed their tasks with exceptional tact and
intelligence.”103 Such a full-throated defense from the Commandant was notable and reflected
Vandegrift’s effort to preserve the Marine Corps structure while facing an existential threat from
the War and Navy departments.104 Nevertheless, the incident at Anshan exhibited how a small
unit tactical decision could have a profound impact on the American public via a recently
uncensored press.
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Figure 3: A Postcard printed by unknown servicemen in the Pacific reflects the malaise deployed servicemen
displayed in late 1945. The anger turned to political activism and thousands of letters written were stamped with
“no boats, no votes.” This specific postcard was sold in an online auction from a private collection in Idaho in
February 2022.

As wartime censorship laws were lifted in September 1945, enlisted soldiers, airmen, and
Marines in occupation duties throughout the Pacific expressed their frustration through letters,
telegrams, and organized meetings.105 The Tokyo-based editor of the GI paper Stars and Stripes
estimated that “more than half” of servicemen’s letters for the “Comment and Query” section
were complaints about the slow pace and fairness of redeployment. In a clear nod towards
political accountability, the stamp “No Boats, No Votes” appeared on thousands of letters mailed
from the Pacific in late 1945.106 The situation in North China pressed the palpable angst of
servicemen and their families, and they “flooded Congress” with letters in response.107
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Mansfield was deluged with correspondence from American servicemen overseas containing
blunt assessments and serious reservations about what the future held for them.108 Private First
Class Warren Peterson of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was a candid and frequent
correspondent with Mansfield. Peterson was a student of Mansfield’s before the war and
attended Mansfield’s Far East history class at the University of Montana in 1942.109 Peterson
was skeptical of American policy in China from the outset and kept Mansfield updated with
articles from overseas papers and feedback from enlisted Marines. Peterson’s unit defended the
rail junction at Chinwangtao, a crucial point in transporting essential coal from neighboring
Soviet-occupied Manchuria to the major cities of Tientsin, Peiping, and Shanghai. The 7th
Marines were spread out along a railway line almost 200 miles in length in Hopeh province, the
very section of line where General Peck came under attack.110
Mansfield’s anti-interventionist speech on October 11 in Congress resonated immediately
with Marines in China who desperately wanted to go back home and dreaded the thought of an
extended war. “The Men of the Detachment stationed in Ching Wang Tao, China,” wrote to
Mansfield: “we who are stationed here appreciate the fact that there is at least one man in
Washington who realizes…there is absolutely no reason for us to be here.” Cynically recalling
the fabled imperial duty of the “China Marines,” the Marines of 1945 clearly no longer felt the
same allure of exotic duty. The unknown Marine dryly wrote: “The ‘old’ Corps can claim that
title with our blessings.”111 Included in the letter was a daily “news sheet” distributed by Marine
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leadership that included a synopsis of Mansfield’s position on withdrawal and non-intervention
in China.112 This story could easily have been omitted from the short news compilation, but
instead was selected by an editor and widely distributed to Marines. Purposefully or not, this
story struck a nerve with Marines ready and willing to write to their congressman.
While Peterson was likely involved in the first group letter, he began writing to
Mansfield personally on October 26.
We are in the middle of the most confusing mess of international bluff and power
politics that I ever thought of. I’m afraid we may mess around until plenty of us
get hurt…Yesterday the general in charge of the Communist Army in this area
served notice that he plans to move into Chin Wang Tao and set up a government.
We received orders from Division headquarters at Tientsin to stop him. Today we
checked ammunition and began setting up machine gun emplacements.113
Peterson and his fellow Marines hoped not to need to use their machine guns.
The palpable tension in Chinwangtao was not just a local phenomenon. Some 300 miles
south in Shantung province, enlisted Marines in the 6th Marine Division also expressed a
cautious attitude. Corporal David W. Taylor wrote to Mansfield from Tsingtao on October 30: “I
hope that…those responsible will get the word and take all troops out of here before sombody
[sic] set off the firecracker between these Chinese and have some American boys die. We can
see it plenty plain over here.”114
In a letter to Mansfield on December 6, Peterson expressed further frustration about the
Marines’ convoluted mission. Openly skeptical of official statements regarding America’s aims
in China, Peterson thought that the American position was far from neutral, and Marines were
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openly “aiding the Chinese Nationals.” Peterson presented a series of concrete examples of how
American policy had aided and abetted the Nationalist military.
American-trained, American-equipped Nationalist troops landed in Chinwangtao
from American transports. Apparently the Marines had made a beachhead for the
Nationalists. We had taken strategic points without resistance from the
Communists. Then the Nationalists landed in large numbers and pushed inland.
Meanwhile we guarded their communication and transportation lines.115
In thinking aligned with Mansfield, Peterson extrapolated America’s China policy in the
emerging Cold War context. Drawing a parallel to the US Army’s incursion into Russia in 1919,
Peterson wrote:
There has been more firing at various points up and down the railroad…as many
as five Marines have been shot. I want to know why they have been killed. I want
to know why we are here. I want to know why the American people are not told
what we are doing here…is this an Archangel Expedition to save China from
Communism? Does our government feel that we must keep China under our
influence in order to keep out of Russia’s? Is this the testing ground of World War
III?116

Mansfield wrote back to Peterson and included a copy of his speech in Congress from December
11. Mansfield was “wholeheartedly in accord with” Peterson’s sentiments and solicited further
supporting data from the ground level that Mansfield could use in Congress, including local
press clippings and news stories from the military newspaper Stars and Stripes.117
Some Marines in North China leveraged war correspondents to critique American foreign
policy in stateside newspapers. Marines exposed the difference between US public policy and the
reality on the ground in China with the help of a willing journalist from the New York Times.
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Titled “Marines Angered by China Rail Job,” the unnamed Marines near Chinwangtao noted that
in late December, 9,000 Japanese soldiers were still armed and used for “railway guard duty”
while the Marines guarded a British-owned coal mine against Communist attacks twenty-four
hours a day. Working with the Japanese infuriated the veterans of Okinawa but protecting the
interests of British capital also proved difficult to accept. One Marine noted that he “did not
enlist to guard British property.”118 While perhaps invisible to the Marines in Chinwangtao, the
coal served to prevent a humanitarian crisis during the bitter cold winter months in Shanghai and
Peiping. Both the Japanese and Marine guards enabled the Nationalist Chinese armies to focus
on fighting the Chinese Communists in North China.
Some Marines resented the control the Chinese Nationalist government held over US
policy and wrote letters to newspapers as “a plea to the American people to wake up and take
notice of ‘we’ the servicemen in North China.” In November 1945, “65 Marines from Tientsin,”
wrote a passionate letter to the editor of the Washington Post. The Marines noted their “solemn
and holy duty to protest, in a body, to the American people” that Chiang Kai-shek “in a subtle
way [dictated] the Far Eastern policy of our Army, our Navy, and the Marine Corps.” The
Marines articulated a fundamental lack of understanding of their mission in North China. “We
have all seen boys die,” one Marine explained, “they died with the thought in their minds and in
their hearts that they were fighting for a cause . . . that all minorities oppressed, would once more
be a free people.” In their Nationalist ally, Marines sensed both a lack of shared values and
effort. In the perception of these North China Marines, the US won the war “in campaigns on
far-flung Pacific islands,” but China allegedly failed to contribute. These Marines were
undoubtedly unaware of the enormous Chinese losses from 1931-1945. The Nationalist
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government collaborated with the despised Japanese and wanted Marines to carry their load once
again. Finally, these Marines took time to rebut “that solon from Minnesota,” likely congressman
Walter Judd, who “deplored public opinion” for “voicing a whisper of protest on our behalf.”
Quoting Judd’s call to “Don’t let China down,” the Marines offered an alternate view, “China
has let us down.”119
From October to December 1945, Marines deployed to China resisted open participation
in the Chinese Civil War by minimizing their military role, restraining the use of lethal force, and
writing letters to families and congressmen. In numerous contingent moments in the early
deployment to North China, Marines sought to strike a careful balance between “assistance to a
friendly nation,” while avoiding open participation in “fratricidal conflict.”120 A frustrating and
difficult task, this balance required tremendous discipline, shrewd decision making, and strict
rules of engagement. While the rules of engagement were extremely rigid, information control
and censorship were not. That laxity enabled the young, enlisted Marines to engage in political
activity by writing uncensored letters to their parents, newspapers, and congressmen.
As with all military operations, the moments of contingency apply to all combatants. Just
as Marines deliberately avoided escalation, the Communists also side-stepped massed formations
and limited themselves to small, isolated, harassing attacks. The Office of Strategic Services
assessed this as part of a deliberate Communist strategy to turn American public opinion against
intervention on the side of the Nationalists.121 The troops wanted to go home promptly, and the
galvanizing purpose of winning the war expired with the Japanese surrender. By keeping a low
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military profile vis-à-vis the US Marine deployment, the Communists refrained from offering a
Pearl Harbor type moment that cried for revenge.

Figure 5: Conservative publications like Time and Life magazines attempted to make a case for American intervention in North
China. The imagery, however, clearly depicted the difficult situation of Marines in North China. Henry Luce, publisher of Time and
Life was a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek and a member of the “China Lobby.” His wife, Representative Claire Boothe Luce,
represented a pro-Chiang view in Congress. Image from Life, November 19, 1945.
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Chapter 4
Political Agents: Mothers, Wives, and Citizen Groups

The removal of censorship also brought Chinese stories like the Anshan incident onto the
front pages of newspapers—and into the consciousness of citizens—across America. The
American people relished the promise of a coming peace and resisted the prospects of a new
Asian war in China. At the end of 1945, Americans could proudly reflect upon a four-year
national effort to defeat fascist dictatorships overseas in Germany, Italy, and Japan. In that
herculean task, the United States placed over 16.1 million personnel in uniform, deployed forces
across two oceans, and produced more tanks, aircraft-carriers, planes, submarines, vehicles, and
weapons than any other world power.122 The war touched every portion of society and lifted the
economy out of depression, but at tremendous cost. More than 405,000 uniformed Americans did
not return.123 As the perplexing occupation duty in North China emerged as a potential lengthy
intervention into a civil war, mothers, wives, and citizen groups rose in opposition to a new
conflict via letters to Congress, newspapers, and through organization.
One of the ways citizens sought to influence American policy toward China was by
writing their government leaders. Correspondence from parents, spouses, and citizen groups
suggest that a de facto consensus existed about the need for American non-interference in China
and prompt demobilization of the armed forces.124 Several letters penned by blue-star wives
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(women with husbands in service), pleaded for assistance to return a husband to help raise young
children, run a family farm, or otherwise provide a living. Above all, wives and mothers wanted
their loved ones’ home safely. They remained all too aware of the gold-star wives and mothers
who would never be so fortunate.125
Mothers voiced steadfast opposition to the Marine deployment to North China in late
1945. These women did not mince words. Writing from Stevensville in December 1945, Ethel
Wonnacott reminded Mansfield that mothers wanted their sons back: “I gave my son proudly to
fight for our country but not to fight China’s Civil War . . . he has seen enough war and hell.”
Just in case the blunt meat packer failed to reach Mansfield on the merits, she reminded the
congressman that she was an active voter ready to organize. “I feel the voice of Montana
Mothers should be enough to command your attention.”126 Wonnacott penned similar comments
to Montana Senator James E. Murray noting that “the sentiments of all Mothers” were that
“China’s war” was not worth “one American boys’ life.”127 When Wonnacott later penned a
letter to the editor of the Missoulian, she signed it “A Mother of a Montana Marine,
Stevensville” and issued a call to arms for the community to “raise a howl” so that “Washington
will have to listen…and demand that our sons be taken out of China, fast. The danger is
great.”128 The Missoulian consistently advocated self-determination in the newly liberated
territories of the world—including China. In a line that Wonnacott would later celebrate in her
letter to the editor, the Missoulian opined: “if Chiang Kai-shek cannot win without American
soldiers, what should happen seems reasonably obvious. We shouldn’t fight anybody’s war but
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our own and this is not ours.”129 The angst of uncertainty without clear national purpose rippled
across the nation.
The Missoulian’s editorial position of non-intervention reflected a national trend of
which President Truman was well aware. On Armistice Day, November 11, 1945, President
Truman hosted British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie
King in a ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery.130 At this solemn event, Truman, an Army
combat veteran, undoubtedly reflected upon the tremendous sacrifice of two costly world wars.
The situation in China, however, was also likely on Truman’s mind. The same day, Truman
saved a compilation of six geographically dispersed editorials about American policy towards the
“Civil War in China.”131 The Christian Science Monitor opined that the US was involved in “a
degree of intervention which American opinion will not support even in Latin America and to
which it violently objects when followed by others.”132 The Milwaukee Journal predicted a long
struggle in China and concluded that “it is not an American responsibility to furnish arms…or
one American life to settle this Civil War.”133 The Hartford Courant highlighted the duplicitous
appearance of American intervention and opined that the US should be “scrupulous in avoiding
actions that at least can be interpreted as giving military support to Chiang.”134 Reflecting the
lack of clarity in the US position, the New York Times offered Truman “a way out” of the “East
Asia tinder box” by advocating “a more forthright diplomacy.”135 Earlier that week, on
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November 7, Secretary of State Byrnes announced that “plans were underway to withdraw the
marines,” but he hedged this statement by noting that “marine participation in China is a
military, and not a political matter.”136 Truman likely hoped that this statement would calm
American anxieties over America’s role in China’s internal strife, but throughout the remainder
of 1945, wives and mothers continued to keep the pressure on.
Wives of deployed Marines engaged government officials on the geopolitics of the
confusing US policy in North China. If the Truman administration thought it could lay a
smokescreen of diplomatic jargon and buy time against a distracted public, numerous Marine
wives proved the diplomats and politicians mistaken. Some spouses felt that assisting Chiang
Kai-shek was tantamount to fighting for the kind of fascism so many sacrificed to defeat in
World War II.137 Josephine McBroom Junge wrote: “We asked these men to fight, in Tarawa,
and in Iwo Jima, and in Okinawa—for democracy. Many are dead. Many are crippled…can we
ask them now to fight in China—against democracy?”138 The nuanced logic of America’s China
policy failed to convince interested life partners. Lucy Bell pointed out the hypocrisy of the
Nationalist Chinese forces using armed Japanese troops—that the Marines were in North China
ostensibly to disarm—to guard infrastructure from Communist attacks. “Sir, I am not a person
who is familiar with the intricacies of diplomacy,” Bell wrote with a dash of sarcasm, “but I call
our military operations…out-and-out intervention on the side of the Chungking government.”139
Mrs. B. P. Pope agreed that her husband had no business tipping the scales for Chiang Kai-
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shek’s forces: “the war is over…China should take care of her own internal affairs,” parroting a
line from Mansfield’s speech just days earlier. Pope concluded, however, with a common
sentiment all Marine families shared: “we need him home now – he has done his duty.”140

Figure 4: Even small-town Newspapers regularly carried disturbing news of the growing peril in North China, much to the
chagrin of awaiting families. Image from Newspapers.com, Havre Daily News, November 8, 1945.

While military family members were personally and politically engaged, the pervasive
news stories about the Marines and the Chinese civil war acutely raised public awareness in late
1945. In periodic headlines and stories from October-December 1945, magazines and
newspapers brought the North China dilemma into the homes of Americans. Even small-town
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newspapers delivered the United Press and Associated Press’ stories from North China that
emphasized the complicated position the Marines were in.141
Stories about shifting China policy appeared in a multitude of periodicals spanning the
ideological spectrum in late 1945. The conservative Time magazine observed that events on the
ground in China exceeded the imagination of American post-war planning. “Nobody planned, in
August or September,” correspondent William Gray wrote, “that things would happen this way
in China in November.” Time opined that “we can hardly desert the job . . . until we are sure
some order will go on.” Despite this moral advocacy for intervention, Gray further noted that
“some Americans in China would risk a stronger U.S. policy and go all-out to insure China’s
peace by supporting Chiang’s Government, imperfect as it is.” Gray concluded, however, that
“most Americans in China, being civilians in uniform, are ready to go home, and the hell with it.
They believe that they accurately reflect public opinion at home.”142 Henry Luce, owner of Time
magazine, was born in China to Protestant missionaries and a well-known member of the “China
Lobby” that promoted Chiang Kai-shek.143 Despite a clear editorial bias, however, Time noted
that intervention faced strong public opposition and this political reality would likely “leave
China to God’s opinion.”144
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Figure 5: Major metropolitan newspapers, with independent foreign bureaus, brought news of the Chinese Civil War to
American homes. Image from Chicago Tribune, November 3, 1945.

Some high-profile military officers also spoke out against intervention in the media. The
Chicago Tribune welcomed home Major General Henry S. Aurand from China complete with a
smiling picture of his wife and young daughter. The headline, however, was not about a happy
homecoming, but a political recommendation to “Let China Solve [Its] Own Problems.” Aurand
opined that “it is a great tragedy that China must be torn by a civil war, but let’s not get any
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Americans killed in it.”145 In this bombardment of news stories from China, citizen groups
mobilized with letter writing campaigns, meetings, and advertisements.
Some organized labor groups rallied around an anti-fascist, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist
stance towards post-war Asia. In this criticism, the “Four Freedoms” rationale for World War II
contrasted sharply with the murky aims in North China, leading to speculation that intervention
in China benefited only “the interests of big monopoly capital,” which mirrored sentiments from
enlisted Marines.146 One such group, the Cascade County Trades and Labor Assembly,
promulgated its resolution for withdrawal of Marines from North China in both the local
newspaper and in letters to congressional leaders, writing even to members outside of their
respective district.147 Farmers in tiny Westby, near the North Dakota border, also demanded not
only the precipitous withdrawal of American forces, but a cessation of all forms of US aid
towards Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government.148
Reflecting the local labor response and anti-imperialist rhetoric, communist-aligned
organizations like the ‘Committee for a Democratic Far East Policy’ and the ‘National
Committee to Win the Peace’ mobilized for an end to the American support of Chiang’s
government and a redeployment of American forces. Like mothers, wives, and siblings, these
citizen groups challenged the foreign policy actions of the United States that meddled in the
internal affairs of an ally. In a harbinger of Cold War dilemmas to come, Americans stood for
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freedom and democracy, but such clear outcomes remained aspirational at best in Chiang’s
China. Communist-aligned groups made significant hay of this uncomfortable fact. While
ostensibly neutral, American forces in North China tipped the scales in favor of a “regime that
has denied basic civil rights to the Chinese people.”149 After fighting a national war against
totalitarian fascism and liberating the world, a more nuanced policy fell flat in the court of public
opinion, and citizens groups played a key role in galvanizing the opposition.

Figure 6: Excerpt from the Committee for a Democratic Policy for China, 1945. Series IV, Box 26, Folder 5. Mike Mansfield
Papers, Archives and Special Collections, University of Montana

Both the Committee for a Democratic Far East Policy and the National Committee to
Win the Peace benefited from support by respected leaders and spokesmen. One colorful
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individual associated with both far-left activist committees was the decorated Brigadier General
Evans F. Carlson. Carlson’s illustrious career included time as an observer with Mao Tse-tung’s
forces in the late 1930s. Carlson admired the fighting spirit and camaraderie exhibited by Mao’s
Communist fighters and promoted several organizational and tactical innovations the Marine
Corps adopted during World War II. Introducing the Marine Corps to the Chinese phrase “GungHo,” Carlson led troops at Makin Island, Guadalcanal, and Tarawa earning three Navy Crosses
and two Purple Hearts.150 Suffice it to say, Carlson spoke with widely respected authority about
China, combat, and the Corps. Addressing the California Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) convention in December 1945, Carlson praised the labor union’s resolution that demanded
a rapid return of Marines from China. “It is not compatible with democratic ideals for the United
States to intervene in the affairs of any other country,” Carlson opined to the crowd. At key
moments in the China policy debate through 1946, Carlson effectively rallied public opinion,
Congress, administration officials, and media through a grass-roots network of volunteers.151 It
remains unknown how much clandestine Soviet messaging contributed to anti-interventionist
rhetoric in the CIO, but the possibility should not be discounted. In his memoir, Communist and
CIO lawyer John Abt noted that during this period the CIO leadership “was largely but not
exclusively Communist.”152
Some Chinese citizens, living in the United States, also sought to steer the Truman
administration away from armed intervention and support for Chiang Kai-shek’s government.
The tenor of Chinese participation in American political discourse projected a liberal future that
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this new Mandarin-class sought to build in post-war China. These members of the Chinese
diaspora tended to be intellectuals, university graduates, women, and associated with American
missionary programs such as the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA).
While Chinese citizens could not participate in democracy in their own country, they did
in the United States. Writing President Truman in January 1946, S. H. Huang, a history teacher,
noted that “for the first time in Chinese history there is a great possibility for the establishment of
a united, democratic government.” Yet Chinese democracy, according to Huang, was imperiled
due to “the American armed intervention.” Huang urged the President to withhold American
credit to the Chiang government and to withdraw troops due to “demonstrations . . . held
everywhere in China by students, intellectuals and professional people.”153 Dr. W. H. Chang, a
pediatrician and his wife Ssu-yi Liang, a librarian at Columbia University, implored Truman to
“use your good offices to stop all material aid to the Kuomintang government immediately.”154
Helen Chung, a graduate student at Columbia, suggested that Truman should withhold the loan
“until the new united coalition government” that included both the Kuomintang and Communist
parties could be empowered. Chung added that “the united voice of the Chinese people
[demanded] the withdrawal of American troops, especially from North China, the center of
conflict, in order to guarantee the future peace of China.”155 Yang Kang, the foreign
correspondent for the Ta Kung Pao newspaper, pressed Truman to recognize that “the Chinese
people’s attitude toward the United States is on the crossroads.”156 While little is known about
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the overt political affiliation of the writers, as Suzanne Pepper has demonstrated, the political
leanings of the newspapers offer some insight. The Ta Kung Pao newspaper was associated with
the Political Study Clique within the Kuomintang party.157 Both economically conservative and
politically liberal, this association suggests that criticism of Chiang Kai-shek’s government does
not automatically equate with support of a communist alternative.
Chinese citizens sought not only to directly influence specific American politicians, but
they also engaged with fellow intellectuals and writers. The Chinese rising intellectual class
recognized the power of public opinion in the American democracy. In Kang’s letter to Truman,
she enclosed a translated letter from seventeen writers in China that stated “our hearts are heavy.
For the sinister civil war has broken out in China and there are symptoms that the American
troops in China are involved in it.” The Chinese writers’ group accurately opined that “neither
the American people nor the American soldiers wish to be a part in China’s civil war,” and
professed belief in the “power of [American writers’] beam-like pens . . . to inform the American
people about the truth of developments in China.”158
President Truman in a January 25, 1946, memorandum to Secretary of Commerce Henry
Wallace, noted that he “read with a great deal of interest the letters from the various Chinese
people in this country,” adding that he knew “very little about Chinese politics.” The numerous
letters, however, had more to do with American politics than anything within the Chinese
Nationalist government. Truman approved the loan and Marines stayed in North China; however,
he called upon General Marshall to broker a coalition government in China. Truman concluded
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his memorandum by affirming his long-term aim “to see a strong China with a Democratic form
of Government friendly to us.”159
Newspapers, Congress, and the State Department took notice of the strong wave of public
opinion crashing down on American China policy in late 1945. Slow to catch on, the Truman
administration lost the crucial opportunity to shape the narrative and convince the American
people why the American stabilization of North China was essential to the post-war order.
Carlson’s mobilization of labor unions and committees resulted in a wave of telegrams and
letters to Congress, State Department, and the White House. Further complicating the public
relations crisis, Patrick Hurley resigned as Ambassador to China on November 27 and released a
bombshell letter that excoriated “the Hydra-headed direction and confusion of our foreign
policy.”160 Truman, still privately committed to supporting Chiang, reached deep for a gamechanging trump card.161 At a cabinet luncheon, Truman adopted a suggestion that he replace
Hurley with the widely admired and non-partisan General George C. Marshall. As Marshall
arrived in China to try to bring the warring factions together, Dean Acheson, acting Secretary of
State, painted the mood of the American electorate to Marshall in a classified cable:
“Communications are practically unanimous in opposing US participation in the Chinese civil
war…the CIO and Communist communications are coming in such quantity to suggest an
organized drive.” Just in case the left-wing politics of the organizations gave cause for Marshall
to dismiss the implications, Acheson’s analysis noted that “other communications are so varied
and the geographical spread is so great…that the protests represent a strong feeling among
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people who are acting, for the most part, spontaneously.” Acheson’s conclusion was atypically
blunt: “The use of US troops in China is unpopular with the American people.”162 If Marshall
considered leveraging American force to bring the Communists and Nationalists to the
bargaining table, the tide of American public opinion effectively constrained military
alternatives.
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Conclusion
A Consequential Return to Political Normalcy

The United States avoided stumbling into a quagmire in North China because the
American people rallied against it strongly at the outset. The intervention in North China
afforded an opportunity for a restoration of democratic practices suspended by the war, and a
vocal opposition seized the initiative in public discourse. The dearth of public support ultimately
constrained the policy options for the Truman administration, and the President turned to perhaps
the most admired man in the country—General George C. Marshall—to calm the political
waters. In the wake of the savagery of the Second World War, the American populace—
including its hardened Marines—possessed little appetite to extend the war beyond defeating the
Axis powers. Wartime censorship laws shielded the public from the true ugliness of bloodstained volcanic beaches, but if Marines questioned why they should die to seize a tiny unknown
island, the thoughts were kept close hold. In his epic memoir With the Old Breed, Corporal
Eugene Sledge reflected about how combat with the 1st Marine Division changed him:
“something in me died at Peleliu . . . I lost faith that politicians in high places who do not have to
endure war’s savagery will ever stop blundering and sending others to endure it.”163 As Marines
like Sledge endured the hard slog across the Pacific, they did so with little expectation of
survival, but at least each Marine understood the larger purpose of his peril. The sudden end of
the war changed that in an instant. Indeed, it transformed the consciousness of the American
people as peace at last seemed possible. In a representative democracy, failure to heed popular
sentiment would change the government—something President Truman saw firsthand as British
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Prime Minister Winston Churchill went down in a shocking electoral defeat in July 1945.164
Caught flat-footed at the outset of the Cold War, the Truman administration never delivered the
affirmative case for US intervention in China.
Congressional voices leveraged public appearances, floor speeches, constituent
correspondence, and access to administration officials to shape American policy towards China.
Montana’s Mike Mansfield played an early and vital role in framing the political argument
against US intervention. His three widely disseminated speeches from October to December
1945 publicly challenged the murky Truman Administration policy and provided a rallying cry
to skeptical servicemen, mothers, and citizen groups—despite drawing unwelcome political
connections with Communist-affiliated committees. Behind the scenes, Mansfield repeatedly
influenced key State Department officials and President Truman at key contingent moments as
the young administration sought a coherent Far East policy. Ultimately, Truman did not fully
implement all of Mansfield’s ideas or immediately withdraw the Marines, but the appointment of
General Marshall marked a limited victory for Mansfield’s incessant lobbying efforts. General
Marshall would serve in a diplomatic rather than a military role.
The American citizen Marines were important agents of American policy in North China.
The IIIAC faced a nuanced mission and minimized risk however possible. While the Americans
still engaged in dangerous firefights with Communist forces, strict rules of engagement and rigid
adherence to discipline deescalated tension in contingent moments. Instead of employing their
vast firepower advantages of artillery and aircraft, Leathernecks flew aircraft in unarmed “shows
of force” and maintained a semblance of frustrating neutrality. The leadership, from General
Rockey on down, did not advocate the deployment of more troops or seek to expand the role of

164

Churchill, Memoirs of the Second World War, 995-997.

64

the mission, although ample opportunities to do so existed. Finally, the removal of wartime
censorship protocols permitted Marines like Warren Peterson to make their voices heard in
Congress and to the American people.
Mothers, wives, and citizen groups questioned US policy in China in a manner difficult to
ignore. As the national mobilization for World War II ramped down, spouses and parents
anxiously awaited the safe return of their loved ones. Across America, the loss of numerous
servicemen left countless communities scarred. In a national effort against an existential threat,
Americans accepted casualties as a solemn patriotic duty, but intervention into China’s internal
affairs seemingly contradicted the very justification for the war. The Office of War Information’s
successful propaganda campaign about the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter resonated
and offered little room for post-war policy nuance. A flurry of letters to newspapers and
congressmen originated from apprehensive family members, but rather than simply pining for a
husband, ordinary women displayed extraordinary agency in challenging the Truman
administration’s policy on the merits of freedom, anti-fascism, and democracy. Citizens’ groups,
particularly labor unions like the CIO and the Committee for a Democratic Policy in the Far East
organized effective opposition on moral grounds. Respected spokesmen like the heroic General
Evans Carlson effectively portrayed Chiang Kai-shek’s government as non-democratic and on
balance as more like fascist Japan and Germany than not. Absent a coherent messaging
campaign from the Truman administration, these policy punches landed points with an American
populace who embraced the role of liberator—but not meddler.
In the official government retrospective, the public opinion of an informed and active
electorate played a key role in China policy. In 1949, with the Cold War firmly entrenched and
the Chinese Communist victory all but certain, the Truman administration issued the “China
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White Paper,” in response to a new public fervor over “who lost China.”165 Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State, wrote on the first page that “the inherent strength of our system is the
responsiveness of the Government to an informed and critical public opinion.” In his narrative
description of the 1945-1946 period, Acheson opined that “the Communists probably could have
been dislodged only by American arms,” but it was “obvious that the American people would not
have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later.”166
At the conclusion of a titanic war that Americans ostensibly fought for freedom and
democracy, perhaps it was appropriate that Marines and mothers would organize, debate, and
help shape American post-war foreign policy. For Warren Peterson, Ethel and Gilbert
Wonnacott, and countless other Marines and family members, intervention in North China was
more than a moral, anti-communist, or proto-Cold War position—it was profoundly personal.
These unlikely political actors shaped US-China policy at a key moment in 1945-1946 when the
trap lines of counterinsurgency, nation building, and regional conflict menacingly lurked in the
Chinese swamp. In the restoration of American democracy, their voices were heard.
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Epilogue
An Alternate Path

Over the course of their time in North China, the Marines sustained 42 casualties and lost
22 aircraft, with the worst violence culminating in April 1947 shortly after the failure of the
Marshall mission.167 By mid-1946, only about 30,000 Marines remained in North China;
however, the US maintained a military presence in China until May 1949 when the last 200
Marines departed Shanghai for the final time.168 Ironically, the last unit to depart would be
Warren Peterson’s Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which was among the first to
land in September 1945. Peterson, however, returned safely in 1946 and renewed a successful
academic career, earning his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1956.169 Gilbert Wonnacott
also left China uninjured in 1946 and returned to the Missoula area where he started a family and
joined in his parents’ meat cutting business.170 His mother Ethel, lived to the age of 78 and
remained active in local civic organizations.171 Both Ethel and Gilbert are buried together in the
Victor Cemetery in the Bitterroot valley.
The Chinese Civil War came to an effective end when Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in
December 1949 with a death toll likely in the millions. Mao Tse-tung’s new Peoples’ Republic
of China quickly proved to be anything but democratic. At least a million so-called subversives
were executed, and countless others imprisoned.172 The debate in 1949 sought to answer a
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fundamentally revisionist question: “who lost China?” If an answer truly exists to that question,
it remains elusive. What is certain is that this query and the resulting brutality of the Mao regime
shaped Cold War foreign policy in Asia for the next twenty years.
In August 1964, two confusing skirmishes between US and North Vietnamese ships
tripped the Johnson administration into offensive military action. The “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,”
triggered a swift bombing campaign, naval retaliation, and a nationally televised address. As
President Johnson rallied the nation to stand up to Communist aggression in Vietnam, Montana’s
Mike Mansfield, now Senate Majority Leader, introduced the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in the
Senate. Mansfield’s private concerns about the blank check given to the President remained
hidden from public view. His full-throated endorsement in the Senate, however, was
unmistakable: “the President has set a course for the best interests of the Nation…He asks for
and will have…the support of the Congress and the people of the United States.”173 Congress
overwhelmingly passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate.
The bipartisan support for granting “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack…and to
prevent any further aggression” mirrored the 85 percent of Americans who supported the
President’s response.174 Nineteen sixty-four, after all, was an election year, and displaying
strength against communist aggression proved a Cold War bipartisan axiom. A massive buildup
of troops began in 1965. The III Amphibious Corps—redesignated as the III Marine Amphibious
Force, landed near Da Nang and began military operations some twenty years after a similar
landing in North China.175
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The American people rallied around the defense of South Vietnam, in part, because of the
consequences of the Chinese Civil War and the difficult Cold War political realities of the era.
The United States could not risk “losing” South Vietnam to Communism as it had China. At the
core of this thinking was a series of retrospective “what-ifs.” What if American troops served as
advisors to the Chinese Nationalist forces? What if American forces supported Nationalist
Armies with fire support and aircraft? Inaction—rather than intervention—emerged as the
riskiest Cold War foreign policy. Mike Mansfield quietly offered President Johnson alternate
paths—at least prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident—but top administration figures were firm in
their anti-Communist resolve. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s counter memo to
Mansfield won the day in early 1964: “South Vietnam…is a test of U.S. firmness…U.S.
disengagement and the acceptance of Communist domination would have a serious effect on
confidence.”176 The loss of China was on President Johnson’s mind as he ramped up U.S.
military action in Vietnam. He lamented “the day that the Communists took over in China.”
Johnson went on to project inaction to an even worse fate for the United States “if we lost
Vietnam.”177 In hindsight, President Johnson took the wrong lesson from the Chinese Civil War.
Retrospectively considering China, Historian Barbara Tuchman penned it best: “…history will
continue to present us with problems for which there is no good and achievable solution. To
insist that there is one and commit ourselves to it invites the fate set apart for hubris.”178
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Appendix
On Sources and Methodology

This project started as a research seminar topic during the COVID-19 pandemic in
January 2021. The substantial archival closures presented a formidable, but not insurmountable
obstacle to research. Fortunately, I benefited tremendously from continuous access to the
Mansfield and Murray papers located at the University of Montana. This was a double-edged
sword, enabling a deep and detailed view on constituent correspondence in Montana, but
constraining me to a narrow sample size. Recognizing this limitation, I sought to broaden this
perspective with digital archival materials, periodicals, and secondary scholarship. Expanding
my research base, I found echoes of similar anti-interventionist sentiment in the Congressional
Record, in national newspapers, and among the digital records of the Truman Library and
National Archives.
Constituent dialogue with deployed servicemen, parents, and citizen activist groups is an
insight into grassroots American democracy in 1945. The Mansfield, Murray, and Wheeler
papers are fantastic revelations into public opinion, but all citizens made their thoughts known to
their congressmen. A limitation of this source base is that only motivated citizens would engage
their congressman via letters, telegrams, and postcards. Indifferent constituents cannot be fully
determined and specific public opinion polling data on China does not exist for the critical 19451947 period when most citizen letters were written.179 Not one pro-interventionist citizen letter,
however, was discovered in any of the archival visits. The absence of letters advocating a more
intrusive policy does not eliminate the possibility that some Americans held alternate views,
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however, it does suggest a sizable gap in public enthusiasm. Absent detailed polling, public
opinion, therefore, is subjective. As this research shows, however, the Truman administration
perceived intervention in China to be unpopular.
The Congressional Record captures the United States Congress’s oversight and policy
advocacy regarding foreign affairs in China in the post-war era. Representative Mansfield’s
speeches and committee hearing records enhance and confirm the archival records found in the
Mansfield papers. Additionally, the public thoughts of other representatives like Walter Judd,
Hugh DeLacy, Claire Boothe Luce, and others broaden understanding of the congressional role
in shaping policy towards China. While the records are extensive, they are limited to what
Congressmen and Senators said for the public record and may not include classified briefings or
hearings. Newspapers and declassified State department cables serve to mitigate the potential
source gap in the Congressional Record.
I heavily made use of the Foreign Relations of the United States series for important
clandestine message traffic and State department dialogue. Additionally, online access to the
National Archives and the Truman Library provided numerous cables and policy documents that
revealed US grand strategy, inter-agency coordination, and policy debates for post-war China.
Where archival access proved difficult, such as the policy memorandums from the State-WarNavy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), I relied on secondary scholarship and footnotes.
The official Marine Corps War Diaries of the III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) and
subordinate maneuver elements offer insight into what commanders and principal staff deployed
to North China thought of their mission and operations, as well as key personnel and logistics
information. Much of this is not yet digitized. I attempted to mitigate this by traveling to the US
Marine Corps archives in Quantico, Virginia, and through the limited digitized documents
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available online, to review personal papers and archived orders. While I located several primary
source maps, operational orders, and pictures, an out-of-print secondary source—Victory and
Occupation—was an important find on the archival shelves. This historical Marine Corps
publication yielded important quotes, data, significant events, and reflections from Marine Corps
leadership about the North China occupation.
Newspapers and periodicals between 1944 and 1949 were read by a sizeable portion of
the population and numerous news stories about North China kept average American citizens
informed. To provide an additional picture of public opinion towards American involvement in
the Chinese Civil War, I leveraged newspapers and periodicals from 1944-1949. In selecting
sources, I sought to maximize geographic coverage and to balance editorial bias by casting a
wide net. I searched The Missoulian, Billings Gazette, Great Falls Tribune, Helena Independent
Record, Daily Inter Lake, Montana Standard, and Havre Daily News—as well as other small
newspapers around the Montana—for articles, opinion editorials, and letters to the editor. These
archives not only assist in the understanding of public opinion in Montana, but they also serve to
address what information was available to the reading public during the period. Accessed
primarily through newspapers.com and montananewspapers.org, articles about the Chinese civil
unrest and Marine Corps deployment to China were prolific and frequently appeared with
sensational headlines such as “Five U. S. Marines Killed by Chinese Communists.”180 During
this era, paid daily newspaper circulation actually exceeded the number of U.S. households.181
While such sizable foreign policy debate in the American hinterland is interesting, in order to
eliminate the possibility that this was a uniquely Montana phenomenon, I conducted a review of

“Five U.S. Marines Killed by Chinese Communists,” Helena Independent Record, April 5, 1947.
“Sixty Years of Daily Newspaper Circulation Trends,” media-cmi.com, May 6, 2011, accessed on April 11, 2021.
http://media-cmi.com/downloads/Sixty_Years_Daily_Newspaper_Circulation_Trends_050611.pdf
180
181

72

national newspapers from major cities as well as national news magazines. Newspapers like the
New York Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Tribune maintained their own foreign news
correspondents as did periodicals like Time, Life, and Newsweek. As small-town newspapers did
not typically have an independent foreign news bureau, the Associated Press and United Press
perspectives dominated international news stories. Stories written about China during this period
originated from only a handful of correspondents, yet this was likely the singular perspective that
Americans read. Of 1803 English speaking newspapers operating in the United States in 1945,
the Associated Press and the United Press wire services served 1,247 and 981 papers,
respectively.182
This is an international story viewed through national, state, and local lenses. I look
forward to the opportunity to expand this research in the coming years.
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